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1                              NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-3260
___________
JOHN D. HORTON,
                                         Appellant
vs.
MARIA COSME; CITY OF TRENTON
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 06-cv-06114)
             District Judge:  Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr.
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 27, 2009
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges
Opinion filed: September 4, 2009   
_________
 OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM.
John Horton, proceeding pro se, appeals the order of the District Court
granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment and denying his cross motion for
summary judgment.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
  In their motion for summary judgment, Appellees averred that Horton1
was never arrested pursuant to this warrant, an assertion that Horton does not contest.  
2
I.
In October 2005, a member of the New Jersey State Police charged Horton
with failing to observe a traffic signal.  Two months later, Horton was found guilty of this
offense in the Trenton Municipal Court.  The court sentenced him to community service,
which Horton claims to have completed.  Despite the apparent resolution of the case, the
Municipal Court later sent Horton a notice stating that a warrant had been issued for his
arrest based on his failure to answer the summons relating to the October 2005 traffic
violation.  There is no indication, however, that Horton was ever arrested pursuant to this
warrant.1
In December 2006, Horton initiated the instant action by filing a complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988 in the District Court.  He alleged that
Appellees – the City of Trenton and Trenton Municipal Court Administrator Maria
Cosme – violated his Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy by attempting to
prosecute and punish him twice for the same offense.  He also raised several additional
claims, which he appeared to base on state law.
Appellees ultimately moved for summary judgment, and Horton countered
by filing a cross motion for summary judgment.  The District Court granted Appellees’
motion and denied Horton’s cross motion, concluding that his double jeopardy claim
3lacked merit and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. 
Horton now appeals the District Court’s judgment to this Court.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We
exercise plenary review over a district court’s decision to grant or deny summary
judgment.  James v. Richman, 547 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2008).
The Double Jeopardy Clause “prohibits successive prosecution or multiple
punishment for the same offence.”  Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 391 (1995)
(internal quotations omitted).  The Clause is not implicated, however, until a defendant is
actually placed in jeopardy.  United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569
(1977).  Jeopardy does not attach in a jury trial until the jury is empaneled and sworn, and
jeopardy does not attach in a bench trial until the court begins to hear evidence.  Id.
The Double Jeopardy Clause is inapplicable in this case because Horton
was not placed in jeopardy a second time.  After being convicted of the traffic violation,
Horton was never arrested – let alone brought to trial again – for this offense.  That a
warrant may have been issued for his arrest was not enough to place him in jeopardy of a
second prosecution or punishment.  Accordingly, the District Court did not err in rejecting
this claim.
The court also did not err in declining to exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over Horton’s state law claims.  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district
  In addition to presenting his double jeopardy claim, Horton’s complaint2
alluded to the Fourth Amendment and his due process rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.  Although the District Court did not address these references, it
is not entirely clear whether Horton actually intended to allege Fourth Amendment and
due process claims.  Indeed, Horton does not mention any such claims in his brief.  Even
if he did intend to pursue these claims, they are without merit.
court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if “the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”  Because
the District Court had rejected Horton’s federal claim,  the court did not abuse its2
discretion when it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.
In light of the above, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting
Appellees’ motion for summary judgment and denying Horton’s cross motion for
summary judgment.
